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Chapter Five
The Enriching Role of Experience
Randy L. Maddox
“I’m tired of having my interpretations of Scripture dismissed
simply because they aren’t orthodox. Everyone interprets
Scripture from his or her experience, study and reason. Are we
supposed to turn off our minds and let traditionalists think for
us?”1
It would be hard to find a more representative glimpse of the current
debate over the so-called “Wesleyan Quadrilateral” among United Methodists
than this excerpt from a recent letter to the editor of the United Methodist
Reporter. It illustrates that the lines in the debate typically find their most
forceful expression in off-the-cuff remarks rather than in careful programmatic
presentations. It captures the level of passion permeating the debate. It reflects
the tendency of the opposing parties to frame the debate in terms of a stark
dichotomy: either we think for ourselves by relying on our individual
experience and reason, or we submit ourselves to tradition. And it uses the
words “reason” and “experience” as if their meanings are self-evident.
There is nothing wrong with passionate involvement in a debate when
one is convinced that vital truths are at stake. However, it is important in these
situations to insure that our passion does not override honest consideration of
alternative views. Such evaluation could result in clarifications that facilitate
constructive progress in the discussion. With this potential in view, I want to
offer some clarifications about the nature of experience and the various
possible roles that experience might play in theological reflection, drawing on
the example of John Wesley’s appeals to experience. Reflection on this
example should be informative for the present United Methodist debate, since
Wesley’s emphasis on experience was formative of our interest in this topic. I
will begin by using it to challenge the apparent assumption of many
participants in this debate that the meaning of “experience” is clear, or
unambiguous.
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Alternative Conceptions of  Experience 
Consider the following situation: A patient of a group medical practice
is slated for surgery and insists on “the benefit of experience” in the operation.
A puzzled nurse responds “Well, if you insist, but most of our patients
consider it a benefit to have anesthesia so that they do not experience the
operation!” The patient retorts rather curtly “I did not mean that I want to feel
the operation, but that I want a physician with experience in this procedure.”
“In that case,” the helpful nurse replies, “you will want Dr. White. She has not
performed the surgery before, but she has had it herself, so she will understand
what you are going through!”
As this hypothetical case shows, “experience” can be a very ambiguous
term. There is no reason to assume that theological discussions escape this
ambiguity. On the contrary, it is quite likely that some of the confrontations
over using experience in making doctrinal decisions result from the opponents
having in mind different conceptions of experience. This means that an initial
step in building greater agreement on the legitimate contribution of experience
to Christian life and teaching would be to clarify the major alternative
conceptions of this ambiguous entity.2 Sorting out the three conceptions that
create the humorous miscues in our hypothetical case is a good place to begin.
Conscious Awareness of Being Affected by an Event or Action
The first miscue in the conversation of our hypothetical patient and
nurse arose when the nurse assumed that the patient’s request for “experience”
was a request to remain conscious so that he could be aware of the subjective
affect of the operation upon him. This use of “experience” to denote
consciously undergoing an event or action is a common one. It can be clearly
seen in Wesley’s question “Art thou acquainted with the leading of [God’s]
Spirit, not by notion only, but by living experience?”3 As the question
illustrates, this use often emphasizes the subjective dimension of being
affected in direct contrast with a merely objective or abstract consideration of
the source of the affect.
The Oxford English Dictionary points out that this use of “experience”
takes on particular prominence in religious traditions that highlight the need
for a “felt” personal relationship with God.4 Since Methodism is the specific
example cited, it is not surprising that 
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instances with this stress abound in Wesley. One of the clearest cases is a letter
where he insists that even if a man is morally upright and attends all the proper
religious ordinances, “he is not to think well of his own state till he exper-
iences something within himself which he has not yet experienced ... a sure
trust and confidence in God ... the love of God shed abroad in his heart.”5
Sympathetic Understanding Derived from Similar Subjective Experience
The second miscue in our hypothetical case came as the nurse tried
switching to a closely related meaning of “experience.” The basic concern of
this meaning is still with the subjective dimension of undergoing an event or
action, but the focus shifts from the occasion of being affected itself to the
insight gained through this occasion which enables us to sympathize with
others who undergo similar events or actions. While this second meaning is
less common in culture at large, and in Wesley, a good example of it can be
found in his prefatory comments to his edition of Thomas à Kempis’s classic
book The Imitation of Christ:
 ... the great practical truths of religion, the mysteries of the inward
kingdom of God, cannot be fully discerned, but by those readers who
have read the same things in their own souls. These cannot be clearly
known, but by those who derive their knowledge, “not from
commentaries, but experience;” who, by living the life of Christ, by
treading in his steps, and suffering the will of God to rule in them as it
did in Him, have attained to what the heart of a natural man cannot
conceive ... inward, practical, experimental, feeling knowledge.6
Practical Skill Developed through Repeated Performance
The patient’s intended meaning of “experience,” which our nurse kept
missing, related not to any subjective affect on the person undergoing an
operation but to the practical skill developed by the physician performing the
operation. This is the sense in which we speak of “experienced” professionals
and artisans. We typically are trying to designate persons who have become
adept at their trade, not by book instruction alone, but by long practice under a
variety of circumstances. This connotation is suggested in Wesley’s praise for
those Methodist society members who have “more skill or more experience”
with visiting the sick, and those preachers who are 
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“deeply experienced in the work of God, accustomed to train up souls in
[God’s] way.”7
Practical/Moral Wisdom Derived from Life-long Learning
As we move beyond the senses of “experience” suggested in my
opening example, in search of other senses evident in Wesley’s writings, the
first addition to note is closely related to the sense just treated. Just as we can
develop skill in a craft or trade by long-term practice, it has long been
recognized that we also can develop wisdom about the “art of living” through
the challenges and opportunities encountered over the course of our life. This
wisdom typically integrates practical insights with moral sensitivities, which
explains why Wesley stressed that those chosen for leadership roles in the
church should have the benefits of the experience that comes with age.8 Of
course, Wesley recognized that this is not an automatic process. For wisdom to
grow with age, we must remain sensitive and willing to learn, particularly to
learn from our mistakes. This sensitivity is reflected in Wesley’s
hope—expressed when the congregation at the Foundery in London was
evidencing a revitalization after over two decades of stagnation—that he and
his brother Charles would not quench the Spirit here this time, as they had
before, because they had “learned experience by the things we have suffered.”9
Practical Test or Trial as Means of Determining Truth
Against the backdrop of the recognition that living through the
practical trials of life can be a source of moral/spiritual wisdom, it is easier to
understand another use of “experience” in Wesley that sounds quite odd to
modern ears. This use equates “experience” with the action of using practical
tests or trial-and-error to determine truth. It was a common use in English prior
to Wesley, as reflected in Wyclif’s 1388 translation of Genesis 42:15 (where
Joseph announces that he is going to put his brothers to a test) as “Now I shall
take experience of you.”10
While it still found resonance in Wesley, this use of “experience” was
well on the road to becoming obsolete.11 A good way to capture its distance
from present assumptions is to note Wesley’s complaint against the emerging
professionalization of medicine in his day. He faulted them with “setting
experience aside” and building medical 
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research instead on hypotheses.12 By this he was protesting their tendency to
discount traditional folk cures that had been discovered through centuries of
trial-and-error, accepting only those cures whose effectiveness could be
explained by modern scientific methods. While Wesley appreciated the
prominent role of empirical observation in modern science, he questioned the
assumption that reliable insights into truth emerge only in professional envi-
ronments where research is focused on testing prespecified hypotheses. He was
convinced that we should continue to value the way that truth is discovered
through the accidents of life and ordinary trial-and-error, even in a field like
medicine.13
This conviction is reflected in Wesley’s Journal by his frequent
inclusion of instances of discerning truth through ordinary events or trial-and-
error.  One quaint example is his account of how experience delivered him
from his fear of camping out when circumstances required him to sleep
outdoors; the test proved that it was not detrimental to his health.14 A more
important example is his argument that experience demonstrates that the
Lord’s Supper is a “converting ordinance,” since many of his followers had
found in practice that their conversion could be traced back to when they
overcame the traditional inhibitions and approached the Table.15 This example
should alert us that many of his appeals to experience in relation to doctrinal
disputes involve seeking truth through such practical testing.
Observation of Facts or Events as a Source of Knowledge
The main reason that many of Wesley’s peers did not join him in
championing a continuing role for the type of practical testing depended on in
earlier times for determining truth was that they were searching for a method
that would provide greater certainty. They lived in the period after the
medieval assumption that all truth was firmly established and reliably
conveyed in tradition had been challenged and abandoned. While early
Renaissance thinkers had optimistically predicted that this change would
spawn a tolerance of conflicting viewpoints in Western culture, the actual
result was armed conflict between competing orthodoxies in both the religious
and political fields. In desperation, early Enlightenment thinkers groped for a
way to resolve the intellectual differences between the competing parties, so
that the fighting could stop. The most influential figures decided that the only
hope lay in finding a method of 
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determining truth which could be publicly verified and provided absolute
certainty.16
The irony of this noble Enlightenment venture is that philosophers
ended up fighting among themselves about where the reliable means to
certainty could be found—was it in the logical purity of reason or the objective
facticity of empirical observation? The latter option came to dominate British
and North American colonial thought in the eighteenth century and stamped an
enduring empiricist cast on modern Western culture. The word “experience”
took on a distinctive meaning under this empiricist cast. It now denoted
verifiable observation of present facts and events (with experiments aimed
more at enhancing the possibility of observation than at trial-and-error testing),
or the knowledge gained from such observation.
Wesley developed a strong commitment to formal Enlightenment
empiricism through his Oxford education.17 More importantly, he shared the
larger culture’s tendency to associate empiricism with “common sense.” Thus,
when a detractor of Methodism asked mockingly whether Wesley had gotten
his knowledge of the possibility of deliverance from sin by some special
inspiration, he retorted sharply “No; but by common sense. I know it by the
evidence of my own eyes and ears. I have seen a considerable part of it; and I
have abundant testimony, such as excludes all possible doubt, for what I have
not seen.”18 This popularized empiricism is evident in a significant percentage
of Wesley’s uses of “experience,” including many instances invoking it in
support of theological claims. He often emphasizes that the evidence he has in
mind is publicly verifiable by specifying “daily experience” as demonstrating
claims such as the need of newly converted persons for further spiritual
transformation, since they are not instantaneously freed from the “seeds” of
unholy attitudes and desires.19
The Mediated Nature of Human Experience
The six conceptions of experience just surveyed likely cover the range
that Wesley would have been able to distinguish, if pressed to do so, because
they were all current in his day. Dictionaries indicate that the first and last
conceptions, in particular, remain in common use. However, the careful
observer will sense that a unique twist is typically given to these two
conceptions today. This twist is hinted 
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at in the quote that opened this chapter, with its emphasis on each individual’s
experience. By contrast, we just noted Wesley’s emphasis on the public
verifiability of empirical observation, and he was characteristically skeptical of
unusual (i.e., highly individual) accounts of the subjective affect of encounter
with God.20 Behind this difference in emphasis lies our cultural confrontation
with the mediated nature of human experience, which was just beginning in
philosophical circles in Wesley’s latter years.
This confrontation can be best understood by comparing it with the
optimism of the Enlightenment empiricists. We saw above that their initial
hope was to locate a method that could generate absolutely certain knowledge.
Most of them soon conceded, under rationalist critique, that knowledge based
on inductive observation of particulars would always fall short of logical cer-
tainty. However, they still optimistically maintained that this knowledge was
objective (revealing things as they truly are) and categorical (true for all
persons, cultures and times). This confidence was based on their assumption
that the mind was a purely receptive instrument in the knowing process, con-
tributing nothing of its own to an individual’s knowledge.
Through the eighteenth century it became increasingly hard to overlook
the point that this empiricist assumption did not square with the reality that
persons of good will and mental competence often disagree in their
observational reports of the same event or “fact.” While there have been
various attempts to get around it, the conclusion that this reality has forced
upon most philosophers is that our minds contribute actively to observation
(and other types of “experience”). As Immanuel Kant formulated it in an
influential thesis: all human experience is interpreted experience, because it is
mediated through our preexisting intellectual concepts.
The potential skeptical implications of this thesis were offset for Kant
himself by focusing on interpretive concepts that he believed were universally-
shared and invariant, like space and time. Even before Einstein could nuance
this assumption, most of Western culture was being influenced by sociology
and psychology to focus instead on the cultural and individual ways that our
interpretations of experience vary. The cumulative result of this is the current
tendency, at least in popular culture, to reduce experience to mere
“perspective.” Few any longer assume that experience provides knowledge
that is objective and categorical. Instead, experience is assumed to provide
simply my perspective (either as a typical white, 
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middle-aged, middle-class, North American male; or as a unique individual) on
what I take to be reality! The obvious questions about 1) whether my perspec-
tive corresponds in any way to how things truly are, and 2) what claim it has
against other varying perspectives, are at the heart of the vigorous debates
going on in late twentieth-century Western culture.21
The insistence on honoring each individual’s experience in our opening
quote reflects that these questions are also central to current United Methodist
debate over theological method. It might appear that Wesley has little to offer
in dealing with such questions, since he predated their broad cultural
emergence. But if we look closely, we can see his dawning awareness of the
mediated nature of human experience, and of the challenges it would entail.
One of the early glimmers of this awareness is in Wesley’s sermonic
distillation of his major treatise on The Doctrine of Original Sin. The original
treatise could serve as a showcase of the Enlightenment optimism within
which he was trained. The central argument was ostensibly an objective
empirical survey of human behavior, past and present. It drew on Scripture, but
only as a historical record. And it concluded boldly, based on the evidence
cited, that the universality of sin should be obvious to “even the most careless,
inaccurate observer.”22 In comparison, the sermon that distilled this treatise
just two years later was more reserved. Here Wesley begins with the biblical
affirmation of universal human sinfulness. He then maintains that daily exper-
ience confirms this affirmation, but he immediately adds the qualification that
those who have not been regenerated by God’s grace typically do not discern
this confirmation!23 In this move he was conceding that empirical observation
is not as immediate or publicly verifiable as his earlier treatise suggested.
To be sure, this concession does not rule out the continuing optimistic
assumption that all who have received the benefits of regeneration discern
God’s truth and God’s work in their lives immediately, rendering objective and
categorical knowledge. If Wesley was holding on to such an assumption at this
point (1759), ongoing reflection upon his spiritual journey was rapidly
undercutting it. This can be illustrated by his changing evaluation of the role of
Aldersgate within that journey. A variety of factors helped Wesley to
recognize how certain instilled expectations had influenced his initial
interpretation 
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of what he attained at Aldersgate, and the correlated negative assessment of his
spiritual status before that event. As he progressively decided that several of
these expectations were unwarranted or unwise, he was compelled to offer a
revised interpretation of the role of Aldersgate in his spiritual pilgrimage.24 In
this act of revising Wesley was conceding—at least implicitly—that not even
the regenerate can avoid having their experience mediated through their
preexisting expectations and conceptions.25
The recognition of the mediated character of human experience evident
in these concessions is admittedly embryonic. Even so, Wesley showed some
discernment of the temptations that highlighting this character would pose for
theology. The most radical temptation has been to embrace a skeptical denial
that we can know whether there is even such a thing as “reality,” let alone that
our interpretations fit reality. Such total skepticism, while conceivable in
theory, is quite rare because it is so hard to live out in practice. Even the -
rigorous skeptic David Hume acknowledged that he still looked forward to
supper and socializing with his friends at the end of the day (which is why
Wesley dismissed Hume’s skepticism with such disdain).26
Somewhat more common is the polar temptation to rule out any
reliance upon experience in seeking truth, accepting the skeptics’ assumption
that its mediated character renders experience totally subjective. Wesley was
confronted with such a total disqualification of experience in reaction to his
emphasis on a personal experience of the witness of the Spirit. In response, he
willingly allowed that some people “may fancy they experience what they do
not,” but he strongly rejected the suggestion that such cases demonstrate that
every consideration of experience would inevitably degenerate into
“enthusiasm.”27 We will see below why his response would be the same today,
when the reactionary suggestion to dismiss all consideration of experience is
more commonly heard in relation to theological methodology.
The most subtle, and most frequent, temptation in post-Enlightenment
theology has been to invoke the perspectival nature of mediated experience as
a preemptive shield against any suggestion that we submit our personal
experience to broader accountability—to retort, for example, “That is only
your perspective. I am 
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entitled to my own!” This type of response easily degenerates into a situation
like Wesley warned of among some Christian mystics, where one finds “as
many religions as books because each makes his [or her] experience the
standard of truth.”28 Wesley recognized that the fundamental problem with
such situations is not that we have failed to show proper respect to some
abstract orthodoxy, but that we are failing to respect one another enough to
allow that a sister or brother might have a more adequate sense than our own
of how to live faithfully as God’s people in the world.29 That is why he
continually exhorted his Methodists about the importance of “Christian
conference” in nurturing our lives of holiness and made discussion of debated
theological claims central to his annual “conferences” with his preachers.30
One obvious application of Wesley’s exhortation to confer with others
would be to include him in our present conversations about the theological
implications of accepting that all human experience is mediated. This could be
particularly helpful since his response to a growing awareness of this reality
stands in strong contrast with the broad current tendency to accept the
reduction of experience to “individual perspective,” thereby casting it into the
dichotomous relationship with tradition and Scripture. If we will consider
Wesley’s alternative seriously, it might help us to develop an enriched
conception of experience and a broader awareness of the roles of experience in
Christian life.
The Varied Roles of Experience in Christian Life
Wesley’s emergent recognition of the mediated nature of human
knowledge did not lead him to abandon any of the conceptions of experience
identified above. Rather he took this reality into account in the way that he
selectively utilized these conceptions within the roles that he discerned
experience playing in Christian life. To appreciate his moves we will need to
look beyond our focal issue of the contribution of experience to doctrinal deci-
sions. This is only one of the roles that Wesley attributed to experience.
Identifying the other roles that he discerned, and noting how he correlated
certain conceptions of experience to certain roles, will help highlight the
insights that his example can offer into our focal issue.
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Providing Empowerment for Christ-like Living
There is no disputing the common assertion that experience plays a
prominent role in Wesley’s overall theology. However, it is important to
recognize that a major portion of his actual appeals to experience were not
directly concerned with either formulating or testing doctrinal claims. They
reflected instead his emphasis on the contribution of experience to providing
the assurance that empowers us for Christ-like living. This role is captured in
his frequent claim that we human beings are incapable of loving God or others
until we first experience God’s love for us.31 Far from being mere rhetorical
flourish, this claim reflected Wesley’s central assumptions about how we are
able to act in moral ways—i.e., his “moral psychology.”32
Wesley worked out his moral psychology in correlation with his
empiricist commitments about human knowledge. Enlightenment empiricists
denied the rationalists’ suggestions that truth exists in the human intellect prior
to encounter with the empirical world, or that the mind creates truth by
imposing rational order upon sensory experience. They insisted instead that
truth can only be acquired responsively through our sensory encounter with the
world. Translated to the issue of moral psychology, this insistence led Wesley
and many others in his day to reject the intellectualist model that dominated
current Christian moral thought. This model assumed that humans naturally
enact whatever they are rationally convinced is right. On this assumption, the
primary task involved in moral formation is rational instruction or persuasion.
While Wesley appreciated the need for such instruction, he stressed that it was
inadequate by itself, because it failed to appreciate that the human will—like
the human intellect—is a responsive instrument.
To put this point in a practical example, Wesley’s emphasis entailed
that no amount of rational instruction alone could enable a child to express
love for others if that child had never personally experienced love from others.
If we want to help such emotionally-deprived children to love, we must begin
by creating opportunities for them to receive love. Only as their wills are
“affected” in this way will they be inclined and empowered to love in
response.
This “affectional” moral psychology lies behind Wesley’s emphasis on
the witness of the Spirit. He viewed the witness of the Spirit as God’s active
personal communication of love to us. And he believed that it is only as we are
inwardly affected by this witness and 
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become conscious of God’s love that we are enabled to live truly Christ-like
lives, loving God and others.33
Ironically, though this belief grew out of his application of empiricist
themes to moral psychology, it also led to Wesley’s major point of difference
with most Enlightenment empiricists. Since they equated “experience” with
observation by the natural senses, and since God does not appear directly to
these senses, they typically allowed knowledge of God only on the basis of
rational inference from experience. Wesley feared that such secondary
inference could not provide sufficient confidence in God’s love to empower
our Christian lives. This led him to postulate that God created us with a set of
“spiritual senses” in addition to our physical senses, so that we can be directly
affected by spiritual realities like God’s loving embrace.34 This proposal
involved more than adding another set of senses to the Enlightenment model.
Wesley was actually rejecting the appropriateness of the Enlightenment
conception of experience, with its focus on objective observation, for
explaining experience’s empowering affect upon Christian life. His alternative
was the conception of experience as direct inward awareness.35
The extent to which Wesley insisted on the directness of the affect of
the Spirit’s witness eventually put him at odds with both classical Protestant
and contemporary Anglican theology. In these realms a fear of “enthusiasm”
had led to the subordination of any possible direct witness of the Spirit
concerning our Christian status to the “indirect witness” of publicly-
discernible Christian virtues.36 While Wesley agreed that these virtues would
characterize truly Christian life, he refused to make their presence foundational
to our confidence in God’s loving embrace. This would be to resort again to
mere inference, and possibly to works-righteousness.37 To protect against such
dangers, Wesley maintained that we directly perceive (rather than infer) that
virtues like love and joy in our lives are the “fruit of the Spirit.” This claim,
which opponents labeled an assertion of “perceptual inspiration,” became a
focus of Anglican criticism of Wesley. While he was forced to offer in
response several qualifications pointing to the mediated nature of experience,
Wesley clung to the basic insistence that our awareness of the Spirit’s work is
by direct affect.38
In essence, Wesley was suggesting that our awareness of God’s love
for us is analogous to our awareness of our own affections. Before this sug-
gestion is dismissed, I would note that it has had some recent sophisticated
defenses. But I would add that if these defenses 
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are judged convincing, Wesley’s basic suggestion would need to be
appropriated in a manner that takes the mediated nature of our awareness of
our own affections more explicitly into account than his dawning sensitivity
allowed him to do.39
Providing Seasoned Guidance for Our Spiritual Pilgrimage
For all of his insistence on our need for empowerment, Wesley was
well aware that empowerment alone does not guarantee Christ-like living. Raw
energy can destroy as easily as it enlivens; the difference lies in how wisely it
is used. So, where do we look for wisdom concerning how to “put to work”
that gracious empowerment that God is “working in us”? A second set of
Wesley’s appeals to experience highlight its role in contributing such
enrichment. 
The type of experience assumed in these appeals is no longer our
immediate inward consciousness, because this is precisely what needs the
benefit of wise guidance. Failure to seek such guidance can result in what
Wesley viewed as true “enthusiasm,” the confusing of mere imagination with
the leading of the Spirit.40 To guard against this we must “test the spirits.”
While Scripture is central to this testing, there is the parallel need to test our
individual interpretation of Scripture! Extending Wesley’s own moves in this
direction, the way out of this circle is “conference” with others. Such
corporate testing can help us discern when our preconceptions are distorting
our spiritual experience. This potential is heightened if we include in the
dialogue those who have the benefit of long-term experience in the Christian
life.
Wesley’s personal benefit from corporate long-term experience is
reflected in the mature pastoral advice he gave about allowing for a variety in
God’s ways of initiating a saving relationship in our lives (advice quite
different from that which he gave immediately after Aldersgate!).41 Given his
own case, one can understand Wesley’s concern that his Methodist followers
benefit from dialogue with the wisdom of those past and present saints who
have gained experience through the course of their spiritual pilgrimage.42 To
make this wisdom available he republished numerous spiritual biographies of
saints through the ages (as models to be imitated) and gathered many of their
written proverbs and manuals for spiritual formation in his fifty-volume
Christian Library. He also cited them repeatedly. In a particularly revealing
case, he invoked the seasoned wisdom of an 
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early Christian mentor to caution those reveling in their new conversion
“experience” that since they were actually still unexperienced they would be
prone to the false assumption that this one event delivered them from all
inclination to sin.43
One insight we can gain from Wesley in this regard is that he assumed
gathering and sharing this type of experience was a central task of theology!
This assumption was in keeping with earlier Christian precedent. By contrast,
the historical course of Western academic theology progressively isolated
materials devoted to sharing wisdom about spiritual guidance and formation
from those devoted to consideration of doctrine—and denied the former truly
theological status. From a Wesleyan perspective, this must be seen as one of
the major weaknesses of contemporary theology, and the fledgling attempts to
reclaim a model of theology that is enriched by practical wisdom should be
heralded.44
Providing Public Evidence of Central Christian Teachings
There is no need to argue in the academy for the theological status of
the next role of experience evident in Wesley’s appeals. The task of providing
a public defense of the central Christian claims has a long and distinguished
theological career. It is occasionally suggested that Wesley shied away from
this apologetic task. In reality, he simply rejected the rationalist approach that
had become standard in apologetics, in favor of an Enlightenment empiricist
approach. For example, he was convinced that simple observation of the order
in the universe around us points to an all-wise Cosmic Designer. To
demonstrate this, he compiled a multi-volume Survey of the Wisdom of God in
Creation that summarized the current findings of scientific observation and
periodically sermonized on the evidence that these findings provide for God.45
Defending the existence of God is only one agenda of traditional apolo-
getics. Another was to defend the claims that Christianity makes about the
nature of God and humanity which differ from claims of other religions.
Wesley’s commitment to an empiricist apologetic comes through in this regard
as well. He frequently appeals to “daily experience” to confirm such central
Christian claims as inherited depravity and the liberty of the human will from
determinism.46
The appeal to such publicly-verifiable experience is no accident, since
the traditional goal of apologetics was to convince outsiders. If 
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we broaden this goal to include enriching one’s own conviction of the truth of
Christian teaching, we begin to overlap with the first role of experience dis-
cussed above, because our empowerment is correlated to our conviction. This
makes it significant that it is largely in cases of such overlap that Wesley
emphasizes how our inner awareness of God’s working can confirm Christian
claims, including the central claim of the definitive revelation in Scripture.47
Part of Wesley’s motivation for turning from reason to experience in
his apologetic was likely his growing conviction of reason’s inability to prove
any theological claim conclusively.48 His Enlightenment rhetoric can often
leave the impression that he believed experience could attain this goal.
However, at other times he speaks more modestly (and in keeping with
mediated experience) of such apologetic considerations simply strengthening
confidence that Christian faith-claims are compatible with broadly-accepted
human knowledge.
Providing Guidance in Doctrinal Decisions
We come now to the role of experience that is most focal to the present
debates over theological method. This role concerns not how experience can
help demonstrate the truth of established Christian teachings but the logically
prior issue of how it might help the Christian community in discerning what to
teach. Actually, the issue is usually how we discern what to keep teaching! The
formulation of Christian doctrine has seldom been initiated by some official
theological body and then offered to the community of believers (and when it
has, it was often not “received”!). Instead, from the earliest days of the church
theological claims have typically emerged out of a variety of grass-roots
settings and situations, and the doctrinal task has been to discern which of
these claims warranted strong refutation, which could be considered fanciful
but harmless, and which should be endorsed or nurtured for broader
acceptance.
Wesley’s pastoral role in the Methodist movement positioned him to
confront the task of doctrinal discernment often—both in justifying to the
larger church why Methodists should keep teaching their distinctive claims and
in assessing the unconventional currents within his movement. My co-authors
show how he embraced the long-standing roles for Scripture and tradition, as
well as a role for reason, in carrying out this task. He also self-consciously
appealed to
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experience on frequent occasions as both a source and a criterion for doctrinal
discernment.
Behind Wesley’s appeals to experience were two theological
convictions. First, he considered humanity’s sensory and affective capacities to
be divine endowments intended to help us perceive God’s revelatory and
salvific overtures. While he allowed that human fallenness has dulled and
distorted these capacities, he was confident that God continued to uphold them
graciously in their intended purposes.49 Second, Wesley affirmed that God’s
self-revelatory activity is not limited to its normative expression in Christ,
being evident as well (to the discerning) in the created order that we observe
and in which we live out our practical lives.50
While Wesley affirmed a substantive role for appeals to experience in
discerning doctrine, it was never a solitary role. The example in his work that
is most likely to suggest the contrary is The Doctrine of Original Sin. We
noted above that his Enlightenment rhetoric in this treatise verged on
defending this doctrine on the basis of empirical observation alone, but we also
saw that his later sermonic distillation made clear that he was actually
appealing to experience to confirm central biblical teachings. As this might
suggest, Wesley’s use of the various resources for doctrinal reflection was
ultimately dialogical. It was not a matter of simply using whichever resource
seemed more helpful, or of playing one resource off against another, but of
conferring among them until some consensus was found. His expectation of
such consensus was based on the assumption that it is the same self-revealing
God being encountered through Scripture, tradition and experience—when
each of these is rightly and rationally utilized.
Several desired contributions of experience to this dialogical process
are evident in Wesley’s various appeals. The most rudimentary contribution is
help in clarifying the intended meaning of claims found in Scripture or
tradition. An example would be his argument that Paul’s claim “the love of
money is the root of all evil” must mean only that it was the most prolific root
of evil, not that it is the only root, because “sad experience daily shows” that
there are a thousand other roots of evil in the world.51
A closely related contribution is testing possible interpretations of
Scripture or tradition (including proposals for how to correlate apparently
disparate claims within these sources). This is often what is taking place when
Wesley appeals to experience to “confirm” a 
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doctrine derived from Scripture.52 Most of these appeals were on issues where
his distinctive interpretation of Scripture was being challenged—such as,
whether a sense of assurance is essential to justification, or whether believers
continued to struggle with an inclination to sin.53 
A third way that experience can contribute to the dialogue among the
various resources is by suggesting and testing contextual applications of
general principles found in Scripture or tradition. This contribution is implied
in Wesley’s response to a criticism that the band groups he instituted in
Methodism were not biblical: “these are also prudential helps, grounded on
reason and experience, in order to apply the general rules given in Scripture
according to particular circumstances.”54
Carrying this a step further, doctrinal issues can arise that are not
addressed definitively in Scripture or earlier tradition, even in terms of
principles. Wesley recognized that experience would have to play a fairly
substantial role in deciding such issues. As a case in point, since he believed
that Scripture was silent on the question of whether God works entire sancti-
fication gradually or instantaneously, experience became his primary resource
for settling it.55
One other dialogical contribution is evident in Wesley’s various
appeals to experience in doctrinal disputes. This contribution relates not to
discerning whether a particular theological claim is acceptable, but whether it
is central or essential to Christian faith. Between the poles of claims judged
dangerously wrong and those considered essential to Christian faith there have
always been a range of theological suggestions that were deemed allowable
“opinions” but judged unworthy of greater doctrinal endorsement. Wesley
assumed that scriptural and traditional warrant played roles in discerning
where specific theological proposals fit within this spectrum, but his distinctive
emphasis was on experiential evaluation of how the proposal either helped
nurture or undercut holiness of Christian life!56
What kind of “experience” could provide such an evaluation? The first
insight in answering this question is to note that Wesley’s emphasis on exper-
ience in the sense of individual subjective consciousness stayed fairly confined
to the role of empowering Christ-like living. While this empowerment might
flow in part from experience confirming Christian claims, Wesley specifically
rejected the suggestion that he encouraged his followers to derive rules of
conduct, let alone doctrine, from such inner “feelings.”57 This comes through
even in his sermons 
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on the witness of the Spirit. While he presented the event of the witness as a
matter of individual inward consciousness, his argument for affirming the
doctrine of the witness of the Spirit started with his proposed scriptural
warrant and then invoked the specifically corporate test of multiple public
testimonies to verify his reading of scripture.58
This focus on something public, corporate, and hopefully long-term
was characteristic of Wesley’s appeals to experience for purposes of doctrinal
discernment. One form this took was his careful observation (as a “scientist” of
spiritual realities) of the lives of his Methodist people and of the general
populace. The best example is his prolonged consideration of the possibility
for Christians to attain entire sanctification in this life. While Wesley believed
that this possibility was affirmed in Scripture, he willingly acknowledged that
if there were no living examples of attainment his reading of Scripture would
be suspect. This led him to inquire routinely into how many had claimed such
attainment, whether their lives evidenced a depth of Christian love and
holiness to match this claim, and whether this character persisted over time.59 
The focus on a public, corporate, and long-term reality is even clearer
when Wesley’s appeals to experience involve the meaning of practical testing.
These cases express his conviction that a central experiential test of disputed
doctrinal issues is the long-term practical effects of each alternative in the life
of the Christian community. To take just one example, he became increasingly
vocal in rejecting the doctrine of unconditional election to salvation (and the
interpretation of Scripture supporting it) because “repeated experience shows
that it is not wholesome food—rather to [believers] it has the effect of deadly
poison.”60
Of course, simply making the object of his observation and practical
testing corporate would not insulate Wesley from the potential distortions of
his mediating preconceptions. He shows some awareness of this liability when
he criticizes appeals to practical experience by his opponents for focusing too
selectively in their consideration.61 Though he never defended it in these exact
terms, his emphasis on “conference” provided a means to help Wesley take
this liability into account. Conference offered him access to other experiencing
subjects who could test and enrich his preconceptions.
One way in which Wesley benefitted from conference in doctrinal
discernment was by consulting the seasoned wisdom of past saints. 
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As he acknowledged in the preface to his Sermons, he routinely turned to the
writings of those departed ones who were “experienced in the things of God”
when he struggled with how to understand something in Scripture.62 In
consulting such past figures Wesley was (largely unconsciously) challenging
the Enlightenment’s “prejudice against preunderstandings” that had blinded it
to how it prejudicially favored the experience of contemporary socially-
privileged observers over all other human experience—past and present.63
His implicit challenge to Enlightenment assumptions went further as
Wesley found his perspective enriched (often in unanticipated ways) by formal
and informal conference with contemporaries from very different social
settings than his own. As one case in point, his extended interaction with gifted
women in his movement eventually discredited his inherited prescriptions
against women preaching.64 Likewise, his frequent immersion in the lives of
the poor in his societies helped him to see economic matters in a new light. He
remarked for example that he had “lately had more experience” concerning
instances of wronging widows and orphans that caused him to reconsider his
initial assumption that the majority of English merchants were honest.65
While these last examples should not be idealized, they support the
insight that the experience which most benefitted Wesley in doctrinal
reflection was not the elite observational experience of the Enlightenment
scholar, let alone the elite inner experience of certain caricatured forms of
mysticism.66 It was the pastoral wisdom that is nurtured by practical testing in
the daily corporate life of the Christian community and is enriched by
conferring broadly with the experience of others, past and present.
Providing the Goad and Goal of Theological Reflection
There is one other major role of experience evident in Wesley’s
theological activity, and it also contrasts with confinement of theology to the
elite of the academic community. This role is best seen in historical
perspective. Early Christian doctrinal reflection emerged in intimate
connection with daily Christian life. The central contributing figures were
pastors seeking to help their flocks live more faithfully as Christians. As a
result, the ongoing corporate life (i.e., the “experience”) of the church served
as the typical stimulus or goad, and the ultimate goal, of all their doctrinal
reflection. Trained 
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in an Anglican context with its emphasis on the precedent of the first four
Christian centuries, Wesley imbibed this early model of theology. In keeping
with the model, he tended to engage doctrinal issues only at the time, and to
the extent, that they emerged within the ongoing life of the Methodist
movement. And he insisted that the highest purpose of Christian doctrine was
providing practical guidance for Christian life in the world. By contrast,
Western academic theology more generally has progressively severed this
connection of theology to the daily life of the Christian community. The end
result is that academic theology today is largely written by scholars for
scholars in response to scholarly questions, and is seldom read by pastors—let
alone the broader community. This is not to say that professional theologians
are happy with this situation! Many are seeking ways to reintegrate doctrinal
reflection into the life of the church. In this search, Wesley’s model of
privileging the daily corporate life of the Christian community as the goad and
goal of (as well as an important guide in) doctrinal reflection is receiving new
appreciation.67 
Experience as Dialogical Partner
We began by noting how present United Methodist debate over theo-
logical method tends to frame the issue in terms of a stark dichotomy between
valuing my experience or accepting the tradition. By now it should be clear
that this way of framing the issue reflects the impact of both the Enlightenment
critique of tradition and the subsequent questioning of the Enlightenment’s
naive claim to absolute certainty. The perplexity created by this dual impact is
how to avoid the besetting total relativism of post-Enlightenment culture
without lapsing into uncritical traditionalism.
I have tried to show that we have a resource for addressing this
perplexity in Wesley, with his dawning awareness of the limitations of
Enlightenment certainty yet his refusal to embrace total relativism.68 His way
of dealing with this tension offers several potentially enriching counterpoints
to tendencies in our present discussion, particularly in connection to the role of
experience in Christian life and thought.69
To begin with, Wesley’s recognition of the multi-faceted nature of
“experience” calls into question the sharp contrast between experience and
tradition that is so common in the current debate. This is 
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particularly evident with the sense of experience as “seasoned wisdom.” Such
wisdom is a major component of tradition (including Scripture!). Thus, any
adequate conception of the relation of experience and tradition must recognize
overlaps alongside any contrasts.
This recognition calls into question the tendency of both sides in the
current debate to view the role of experience in doctrinal discernment as that of
an autonomous authority (which they either affirm or reject) weighing in
against the authority of tradition or Scripture. Wesley’s more dialogical model
of the contribution of the various criteria to doctrinal discernment stands as a
promising alternative for our consideration.
Just as the various criteria must be kept in dialogue with one another,
Wesley stressed the necessity of conference within the community of faith as
we seek to interpret and apply the criteria. His example puts a particular stress
on including past voices in this conferring, which are often slighted today. At
the same time he reached beyond academic professionals to bring others into
the conference, including some of the excluded voices that are rightly the focus
of concern today.70 Such truly inclusive conference holds the best hope for
helping contemporary United Methodists to recognize our own preconceptions
and achieve some mutual accountability.
Finally, Wesley’s overall practice of making the ongoing life of the
Christian community the typical goad, a fruitful guide and the ultimate goal of
his doctrinal reflection stands in sharp contrast to the distance between our
privatized experience and our professionally-marginalized theology.
United Methodists have been at the forefront of those seeking to enrich
our experience by including the experience of excluded contemporaries. If we
were to add Wesley’s experience to this mix, it could help in recovering a truly
enriching role of experience in our lives and theology!
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